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Braudo-Bahat: Relational Conceptualization of Personal Autonomy

TOWARDS A RELATIONAL
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE RIGHT
TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY
YAEL BRAUDO-BAHAT*
ABSTRACT
This Article lays the foundation for a relational conceptualization of the
right to personal autonomy, where personal autonomy is perceived as a
fluid and dynamic competency, which evolves and flourishes through one’s
web of relationships. On its face, the more common, liberal conception of
personal autonomy seems more fitting for the articulation of the right to
personal autonomy, as most Western legal systems are based on liberal
grounds. Indeed, several liberal legal scholars have addressed the right to
personal autonomy and the state’s duty to promote it. Nonetheless, I show
that the liberal conception of autonomy is limited in its ability to serve
usefully as a basis for the right to personal autonomy, for several reasons.
Most notably, as feminist and communitarian critics have highlighted, the
liberal conception of personal autonomy is mostly based on an inaccurate
perception of persons and autonomy. As shown in this Article, the
relational conception of autonomy provides a more complex and accurate
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account of personal autonomy, and thus can serve as a better basis for
developing the legal right to personal autonomy. Throughout the Article, I
analyze the conditions needed for the development of personal autonomy
and define the right to personal autonomy, as well as the role of the state in
promoting it. Besides ensuring the availability of a satisfactory variety of
options (a condition that has been developed by liberal scholars and
embraced by relational ones), the state’s responsibility also includes
ensuring the availability of constructive relationships through which one’s
personal autonomy can thrive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In liberal societies, personal autonomy is considered essential for one’s
ability to lead a meaningful life. Although it has not been officially
recognized in most Western legal systems as a legal right (Israel being an
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exception in this regard1), its significance is often mentioned in cases and
legal scholarship. Moreover, some liberal legal scholars advocate the
recognition of personal autonomy as a legal right. Joseph Raz, for
example, recognizes autonomy as an “ultimate value”2 and discusses the
state’s ability to promote the personal autonomy of members of the
society.3 Although Raz seems reluctant to recognize personal autonomy as
a legal right per se,4 Jeremy Waldron shows that Raz does address a state’s
duty to promote its citizens’ autonomy.5 More explicitly, Hanoch Dagan
addresses a state’s responsibility for actively promoting its citizens’
personal autonomy by providing institutional pluralism.6
Despite the apparent centrality of personal autonomy and the emerging
recognition of the right to autonomy, and while the liberal conception does
provide a preliminary basis for developing the right to personal autonomy, 7
I argue in this Article that the liberal conception of personal autonomy is
insufficient for this task, for several reasons. First, the liberal conception
emphasizes a person’s individuality and independence, and portrays
autonomy as an internal and isolated process.8 Thus, the liberal conception
makes it rather difficult to define the role of others, including the state, in
actively promoting one’s personal autonomy. Second, the individualistic
focus leads to an imprecise conceptualization of personhood and personal
autonomy, as in reality persons are not isolated from each other but rather
1. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
2. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 205 (1986).
3. Id. at 265, 428. The term “state” in this Article refers generally to a state’s

official authorities (such as legislators, courts, executive authorities, policymakers,
etc.). In addition, I use the terms “members of the society” and “citizens”
interchangeably, but intentionally abstain from defining their scope. The question
regarding to whom a state is obliged is substantial but exceeds the goals of this Article,
which merely focuses on the definition of a specific right.
4. Id. at 247 (arguing that acknowledging the right to personal autonomy requires
placing a heavy burden on private persons and not only on the state).
5. See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1123-24 (1988); see also Nicole Hassoun, Raz on
the Right to Autonomy, 22 EUR. J. PHIL. 69 (2011).
6. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1409, 1424 (2012) (“An autonomy-based pluralism must take seriously the state’s
obligation to provide a sufficiently diverse set of robust legal frameworks for people to
organize their lives.”).
7. Mostly, the liberal conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy focuses
on state’s responsibility to expand the variety of one’s options, thus promoting her
autonomy. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 2, at 205; Dagan, supra note 6, at 1424; see also
infra Section I.C.
8. For further explanation of the critique on the liberal conception of autonomy,
see infra Part II.
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are embedded within networks of relations and relationships.9 Basing the
conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy on a partial conception
of personhood and autonomy might infringe autonomy instead of
promoting it.
A more adequate conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy
can be provided by the relational account of personal autonomy. 10 As
thoroughly discussed throughout this Article, although the relationalautonomy scholars have criticized the liberal conception of personal
autonomy, they have not negated the mere significance of personal
autonomy. Rather, they developed an alternative conceptualization of
personal autonomy — one that highlights the social interactions and
relationships through which one’s autonomy evolves and develops. While
many liberal scholars conceptualize autonomy as a strictly rational and
internal process of considering one’s options and reflecting upon one’s
preferences,11 relational scholars conceptualize it as a more dynamic
process. Most persons develop their autonomy and reach autonomous
decisions by learning from and consulting others. Moreover, persons’
emotions and embodiedness (and not just their rationality and reason)
influence their decisions, preferences and choices.
Nevertheless,
conceptualizing persons as inherently relational does not contradict their
individuality. On the contrary, the relational conception characterizes
persons as both constantly embedded within relationships and distinct from
each other; as both independent and interdependent; as both rational and
embodied.
In other words, personal autonomy in its relational
conceptualization is best conceived as a synergy between the individuality
and the interconnectedness of persons and personhood. I argue that the
conceived synergy should serve as the basis for the articulation of the right
to personal autonomy.
Moreover, the relational scholarship views the state as a major actor with
which a person interacts, i.e., it considers the relationship with the state as a
substantial relationship within which one’s personal autonomy is
9. The individualistic focus as well is discussed infra Part II.
10. To mention but a fraction of the prominent scholarship on relational autonomy:

AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014);
FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF (Diana T. Meyers ed., 1997); RELATIONAL AUTONOMY
(Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY,
GENDER, POLITICS (2003); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE
(1989); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS (2011); John Christman, Relational
Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL.
STUD. 143 (2004).
11. See, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12
(1988); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J.
PHIL. 5, 20 (1971).
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developed. The substantial relationship affords a stronger foundation for
the role of the state in promoting personal autonomy than the one provided
by the liberal conception. However, since most of the scholarship on
relational autonomy is philosophical, it rarely deals with public policy.
Consequently, it has not yet directly addressed personal autonomy as a
legal right. Although legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky draws a connection
between relational autonomy and legal discourse in her groundbreaking
book Law’s Relations,12 she does not explicitly develop the right to
personal autonomy. My aim in this Article, therefore, is to reconceptualize the legal right to personal autonomy and state’s
responsibility to promote it, based on the theoretical literature on relational
autonomy. The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss the
liberal conception of personal autonomy and the definition it provides for
the state’s role in promoting it. Part II addresses the limits of the liberal
conception of personal autonomy, mainly by discussing its feminist
critiques. Part III explores the relational conception of personal autonomy,
as developed in the literature thus far. Part IV introduces the preliminary
relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy and of the
state’s role in promoting it. The last Part concludes by pointing to the need
for further development of the relational conceptualization of the right to
personal autonomy in various legal contexts.
II. THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY
A. Personal Autonomy in a Nutshell
Liberal scholarship defines personal autonomy as the ability of a person
to be the author of her own life, determine her “self-law,”13 and make her
own choices. The autonomous ideal, according to Raz, is a person’s
control over her own destiny, by an ongoing series of choices throughout
her life.14 Such choices may be anecdotal or substantial, and either shortor long-term.15 Philosopher Harry Frankfurt adds to the definition the
consistency and coherency of such choices with a person’s values, identity

12. NEDELSKY, supra note 10 (uncovering the inherent limits of the liberal
conceptualization of autonomy and rights in legal discourse and advocating their
reconceptualization in relational terms); see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive
Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational
Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567 (2011).
13. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12. “Self-law” the literal meaning of “autonomy”:
auto=self; nomy=law. Note that this Article focuses on personal autonomy rather than
moral autonomy.
14. RAZ, supra note 2, at 369.
15. Waldron, supra note 5.
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and morality.16 Personal autonomy, in other words, relates to the ability to
live according to a self-made life-plan while making concrete choices that
conform with it.
In order to lead an autonomous life, a person’s considerations, volitions,
and preferences should be authentic, i.e., should be the product of her free
will rather than formed by coercion or manipulation.17 As we shall see,
there is no need for one’s choices to be “clean” of external social
influences, but they should be consciously and actively formulated,
examined and chosen by the person herself. Choices that a person is
coerced into making are not authentic and therefore not autonomous.18
Similarly, choices that are the result of manipulation are not autonomous
either.19 At the basis of the conceptualization of autonomy lies the rational
and reasonable individual agent. The agent is able to consider the possible
consequences of her choices and verify the coherence between her choices
and her preferences, as well as between her choices and her life-plan.20 Her
rationality and reason enable the agent to distinguish herself from others,
develop her independent opinions and unique character, and be enterprising
and innovative.21 They also enable her to be responsible for her own
actions and choices.22
Liberal scholars also address the personal relations and social
connections that influence one’s autonomy. Philosopher Gerald Dworkin,
for example, discusses such influences on one’s choices and preferences.
Rational choice, according to Dworkin, includes, inter alia, the norms,
values and rules that are learned and acquired from one’s social
environment.23 Although the agent cannot control these norms and values,
they do not infringe one’s autonomy. On the contrary, autonomy should be
realistic and viable, and if a condition for autonomy were to be a complete
independence of one’s choices from her social environment, it could not be

16. Frankfurt, supra note 11.
17. On authenticity, see John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political

Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/.
18. RAZ, supra note 2, at 150-57.
19. Id. at 377-78. Manipulation is the use of tactics aimed at changing one’s
preferences and making her choose options that she otherwise would not have chosen.
20. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 47-53 (1992).
21. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17-18 (2d ed. 1863).
22. Thomas C. Heller & David E. Wellbery, Introduction, in RECONSTRUCTING
INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 1,
1-2 (Thomas C. Heller, David E. Wellbery & Morton Sosna eds., 1986).
23. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12.
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achieved.24 Moreover, according to Dworkin, autonomy, having a central
personal value, should be consistent with other substantial values, such as
loyalty, commitment and love.25 Dworkin therefore contends that
considering others’ needs is a legitimate part of the autonomous process of
decision-making.26
Raz also refers to the connection between personal autonomy and one’s
relationships. He argues that in order to be autonomous, one needs be able
to develop relationships and constitute long-term projects and
commitments.27 For those projects and commitments to be successful and
meaningful, they should conform to social norms.28 Of course, one can
reject some of those norms, but in order to succeed it is crucial that at least
some personal goals conform to them; otherwise, the person might
constantly fail to achieve her goals. Such failures might lead to the
infringement of her personal welfare and autonomy. Since social norms
influence one’s relationships, choices, goals and commitments, and all of
those influence her autonomy,29 Raz concludes, the ideal of personal
autonomy does not resonate with extreme individualism.30
B. The Conditions for Personal Autonomy: The Procedural Account of
Autonomy
Some liberal scholars have articulated the conditions that are required for
leading autonomous lives and making autonomous decisions. This branch
of scholarship is referred to as the procedural account of autonomy. 31
According to this account of autonomy, autonomous decisions should be
made through a process of internal consideration of a person’s desires and
preferences. The internal consideration process is known as “critical
reflection,” and it includes the examination of the preferences, as well as
the way in which they have been formed, their advantages and their costs.
The ability to critically consider the preferences, their sources and
consequences makes a person autonomous. Such a process is required for
concrete choices, as well as for determining one’s long-term life-plan.32
When conducted rationally and reasonably, critical reflection enables a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 21-23.
RAZ, supra note 2, at 154, 383.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 205-06.
See DWORKIN, supra note 11; Frankfurt, supra note 11.
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 7-12, 17.
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person to distinguish between her immediate desires and her volitions.33
Critically reflecting on them enables the development of one’s authentic
preferences and ultimately results in rational and autonomous decisions.34
Critical reflection also enables the formation of a variety of options from
which one can choose the most preferable. Raz argues that a person cannot
be autonomous and make autonomous choices unless she has an adequate
variety of options.35 Those options can be short- or long-term,36 and they
should be sufficiently distinct from one another.37 Like autonomy in
general, those options too are influenced by a person’s social environment
and one’s commitments to others.38 Moreover, Raz emphasizes that in
order to be autonomous, a person must be aware of the existing options: the
mere existence of options is not enough.39 Unawareness can stem from
ignorance or from blindness to existing options.40 The lack of an adequate
variety of options, either objectively or subjectively, infringes one’s ability
to lead an autonomous life.
For one to adequately conduct a process of critical reflection and form
her variety of options, she needs to be competent. Such competency is
defined in liberal scholarship as a cognitive capacity that enables a person
to identify her options, create new ones, critically consider them, and
eventually choose and execute the preferable one.41 In this context, as well,
a person’s rationality and reason are considered the main qualities that
enable a person to be aware of her desires, volitions and preferences and to
distinguish between them, i.e., they are central and crucial for the ability to
33. For further discussion on the differences between first-order desires and
second-order volitions, see Frankfurt, supra note 11.
34. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 20.
35. RAZ, supra note 2, at 204, 273. It bears mention that too wide a variety of
options might make the choice between them rather difficult and thus infringe
autonomy instead of enhancing it. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
WHY MORE IS LESS (2004); Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of Private Law, 66
U. TORONTO L.J. 392, 412 n.66 (2016); Maytal Gilboa & Omer Y. Pelled, Optimizing
Autonomy in the Law (July 31, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(arguing that expanding one’s options also creates substantial costs, such as mental
costs of making a decision, costs of regretting one’s choice after it has been made,
information costs, and risk-of-error costs). It is extremely difficult to explain what is
considered too wide a variety, and I therefore leave it outside the scope of the current
Article.
36. RAZ, supra note 2, at 374.
37. Id. at 375.
38. Id. at 154, 383.
39. Id. at 371 (“To choose one must be aware of one’s options.”).
40. Id. at 382 (referring to such blindness as “self-deception”).
41. See MILL, supra note 21; RAZ, supra note 2, at 343-71.
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be autonomous.42
In addition, both critical reflection and the formation of a variety of
options should be independent of coercion and manipulation. Some
authors refer to such independence as “procedural independence.”43
According to Raz, coercion narrows the variety of options, since some
options become unavailable.44 Coercion also infringes the process of
critical reflection, since even if one has several options the coercion
Similarly,
substantially subverts her preferences and choices.45
manipulation infringes procedural independence, as it leads a person to
develop preferences and options that would not have been developed (or
chosen) otherwise.46
C. The State’s Responsibility Under the Liberal Conception of Personal
Autonomy
The conditions discussed in the previous Section provide a preliminary
basis for developing the legal right to personal autonomy and defining the
state’s duty to promote it. Indeed, some liberal legal scholars have
addressed several aspects of those right and duty, focusing mainly on the
responsibility of the state and other actors to expand a person’s variety of
options.47 Raz, for example, demonstrates the state’s responsibility for
expanding citizens’ variety of options by advocating the recognition of gay
marriage. He argues that when states avoid such recognition they prevent
gay people from enjoying the benefits of marriage as a legally and socially
recognized institution. This narrows their variety of options and infringes
their personal autonomy.48 Interestingly, when recently holding that
preventing gay marriage is unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court
related as well to the need to enhance gay couples’ autonomy by providing
them with the ability to choose to marry (along with other options for

42. Frankfurt, supra note 11, at 11-12.
43. See DWORKIN supra note 11; RAZ, supra note 2, at 377-78.
44. See RAZ, supra note 2, at 377; see also Harry Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities

and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829, 830-31 (1969).
45. The most obvious example is the choice to give in to a robber’s demands in
order to save one’s life.
46. See RAZ, supra note 2, at 377; see also Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analyses
of Unfree Action, 8 CAN. J. PHIL. 211, 217 (1978).
47. See generally Waldron, supra note 5, at 1120-22.
48. See RAZ, supra note 2, at 205-07; see also Shahar Lifshitz, The Pluralistic
Vision of Marriage, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE
NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 260 (Elizabeth Scott & Marsha
Garrison eds., 2012) (regarding the need for institutional pluralism with regard to
regulating and formulating spousal relationships).
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formalizing their relationships), thus expanding their variety of options.49
Dagan addresses another aspect of the state’s responsibility for
expanding persons’ variety of options by focusing on institutional pluralism
with regard to contracts and property.50 According to Dagan, the state has
to provide its citizens with a variety of legal institutions that enable them to
choose their preferable and suitable ways for designing their relationships
with others. A monistic approach to contracts and property narrows those
options, infringes citizens’ autonomy, and might lead to an inadequate
formation of contractual and property relationships. Dagan therefore
advocates an institutional pluralism in both legal branches and casts this
responsibility on the state. In a recent article, Dagan and Avihay Dorfman
develop the notion of relational justice and expand the active responsibility
of promoting personal autonomy from the state to other persons as well.51
Mainly, they focus on the duty of persons to accommodate each other’s
choices (though not in an unlimited manner52). State’s responsibility in this
regard is to formulate the legal schemes that cast such horizontal duties and
to enforce them.
Another significant example of promoting the right to personal
autonomy lies within the doctrine of informed consent.53 In a nutshell, this
doctrine aims at promoting one’s autonomy by requiring hospitals and
physicians to disclose the information on one’s medical condition and the
various available treatment options.
Disclosure enables her to
autonomously choose the treatment she prefers.54 When harm is caused by
medical treatment that has not been consented to, the injured individual is
entitled to compensation even if the physician and hospital were not
negligent.55 The Israeli Supreme Court has further developed the informed
consent doctrine and determined that the absence of informed consent in
49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (Kennedy, J.).
50. See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (2013); Dagan, supra note 6.
51. Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1395 (2016).
52. Id. at 1422-24.
53. For a discussion on the connection between informed consent and personal
autonomy, see RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 235 (1986). The example of informed consent will also be referred
to in a further part of this Article. See infra Section IV.B. It should nevertheless be
emphasized that informed consent serves in this Article as a mere example, and is
therefore not thoroughly developed and discussed.
54. One of the American landmark cases in this context is Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 13-14 (1987).
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and of itself constitutes a compensable tortious wrongdoing — even when
no physical damage was caused, and even when it can be proven that the
patient would have chosen the same treatment if her informed consent had
been obtained.56 The Court based its ruling on the acknowledgement of the
right to personal autonomy, infringement of which is compensable.57 As
far as I know, Israel is the only legal system that has thus far officially
established the right to personal autonomy in the informed consent
context,58 but nonetheless, informed consent is considered a prominent
doctrine in most Western legal systems. It can therefore be argued that
most legal systems acknowledge, albeit unofficially and indirectly, some
form of the right to personal autonomy.
The examples discussed above highlight two major ways in which the
state can and should actively promote personal autonomy: direct and
indirect. As regards institutional pluralism, the responsibility to promote
personal autonomy is cast directly upon the state: it should provide an
adequate variety of legal options to regulate spousal, contractual and
property relations. As regards relational justice and informed consent, the
duty falls upon private people and upon private (or semi-private)
institutions. The duty of the state in the latter cases is to define the
personal and institutional duties and enforce them. Whether casting a
direct or indirect duty upon the state, the liberal conception of personal
autonomy can serve as a preliminary basis for the articulation of the legal
right to personal autonomy.
Nevertheless, the liberal articulation of this right is insufficient, since it
focuses mostly (and almost exclusively) on the variety of available options,
and on the state’s and others’ responsibility to expand it. The variety of
options is, of course, crucial for autonomy, as one cannot act autonomously
when lacking adequate options, but it is not enough: other conditions —
namely conducting critical reflection processes and developing a
competency for autonomy — are also needed. However, under the liberal
conception of personal autonomy it is rather difficult to conceptualize and
define the state’s (or others’) duty to promote the other conditions of
autonomy: those conditions are considered internal and independent, and
thus the involvement of the state (or others) in such processes can be
56. See CA 2781/93 Daka v. Carmel Hosp. 53(4) PD 526 (1996) (Isr.); Assaf
Yaakov, The Daka Case: The Metamorphosis of the Right to Autonomy, 52 MISHAPTIM
[HEBREW U. L. REV.] 5 (2012) (Isr.).
57. The right to personal autonomy has gradually been expanded in Israeli legal
discourse to non-medical cases as well. See, e.g., CA 1138/97 Tnuva v. Rabi 57(4) PD
673 (2003) (Isr.) (ruling that withholding information on adding silicone to drinking
milk infringes peoples’ autonomy to choose whether or not to consume the milk).
58. See Yaakov, supra note 56, at 5, 81.
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understood as manipulation or even coercion. This limitation of the liberal
conception of personal autonomy is discussed in the next Part.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION
A. The Dominance of Individualism
Many critiques have been voiced against the individualistic nature of
personal autonomy, as constructed in liberal scholarship.59 Some of them
are specifically directed at the conceptualization of the autonomous process
as an internal, Cartesian process: the person is usually perceived, according
to the critics, as an inner citadel, in which the process takes place.60 The
problem with such conceptualization is twofold. First, it limits the ability
to articulate state’s (and others’) duty to actively promote personal
autonomy, since such involvement might be perceived as coercion and
manipulation, as mentioned above. Second, it conveys a partial and
inaccurate image of personhood and autonomy. In reality, a major part of
one’s choices and preferences evolve and take form through discussion of
them with others, consultation with others, and more broadly — interaction
with others.61 An inaccurate conception of personhood and personal
autonomy, as Nedelsky warns us, leads to an inaccurate conceptualization
of legal rights.62
Most notably, it might lead to an inaccurate
conceptualization of the legal right to personal autonomy.
Alongside the critiques on the individualistic nature of the autonomous
process, some feminist critiques also focus on the separation between
autonomy, dependence and care. Philosopher Loraine Code points out that
interdependence, which is inherent to interpersonal relationships, is
conceived by many liberal scholars as a threat to personal autonomy.63

59. Such critiques have been voiced by communitarian scholars, such as MICHAEL
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982), and CHARLES TAYLOR, What
Is Human Agency, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15
(1985). They are also found in scholarship on identity politics, see, e.g., IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990), as well as in feminist
scholarship, see, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10 (providing an overview of feminist
critiques); Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the
Feminist Critique, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF, supra note 10, at 40 (same). The
discussion in this Article focuses mainly on the feminist critiques.
60. Annette C. Baier, Cartesian Persons, 10 PHILOSOPIA 169 (1981); Marina A.L.
Oshana, Personal Autonomy and Society, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 81 (1998); Natalie Stoljar,
Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 375
(2011).
61. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 59-60; Stoljar, supra note 60.
62. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 38.
63. LORRAINE CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNOW? FEMINIST THEORY AND THE
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Nedelsky shows as well that in Western culture a person is considered
autonomous if she is free from collective and community constraints.64
However, as Nedelsky argues, no person is completely independent from
others, and more importantly, the development of personal autonomy stems
from — and occurs within — the dependency of people on one another.65
Philosopher John Christman makes a similar contention, arguing that each
person is inherently dependent on other persons, institutions, social groups,
social norms, etc., and that consequently the development of one’s personal
autonomy depends on all of those.66 In other words, conceiving
autonomous persons as inherently independent and disconnected from each
other leads to a misconception of personhood and personal autonomy, and
might therefore lead to a misconception of the right to personal
autonomy.67
Another strand of critiques focuses on the abstractness of the
autonomous person.
As a part of the internal, individualistic
conceptualization of the autonomous person, liberal scholarship
emphasizes the person’s rationality and reason, while ignoring physical and
emotional aspects. The abstract person lacks any characteristics that
distinguish her from other persons, such as color, sex, gender, physical
disabilities, emotions and feelings; and ignorance of physical or emotional
aspects serves as the basis for the liberal conceptualization of equality and
rights.68 However, as feminist scholars argue, this abstract image of
persons and personhood actually leans on the image of white men.69
Consequently, women and other social minorities that are identified with

CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 79 (1991); Lorraine Code, The Perversion of
Autonomy and the Subjection of Women: Discourses of Social Advocacy at Century’s
End, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 181.
64. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 52 (using the image of the isolated Marlboro man
as a symbol of the aspiration to independence and autonomy).
65. Id. at 28.
66. John Christman, Autonomy, Independence, and Poverty-Related Welfare
Policies, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 383 (1998).
67. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 47-50. Note that Dagan and Dorfman
attribute the separation between autonomy and dependence to the libertarian conception
of autonomy rather than to the liberal one. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 51, at
1414-15.
68. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 161. But see Dagan & Dorfman, supra note
51, at 1414-17 (arguing that a profound account of liberal equality does not disregard
differences between persons, and that persons should respect others as equals
regardless of such differences).
69. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 51 (1990); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989).
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physical and emotional characteristics are considered less autonomous, and
are thus exposed to being treated paternalistically.70 It is also harder for
those groups to identify with the prevailing conception of personal
autonomy.
Moreover, the abstract conception of the autonomous person directly
influences the conceptualization of the autonomous process. Here as well,
the liberal conception emphasizes the intellectual, rational and reasonable
aspects of the process, while ignoring its physical and emotional aspects.71
The autonomous process, according to relational scholars, is not just
intellectual and not influenced only by reasonable considerations. Rather,
it is also influenced by the person’s concrete physical characteristics (such
as sex, color, body size, etc.), as well as constant and temporal physical
conditions (such as disability, hormonal changes, fatigue, physical strength,
sickness, health, etc.).72 It is also influenced by a person’s emotional state:
happy, excited, sad, angry, confident or worried. Any attempt to
disconnect the body and the emotions and base the process of autonomous
decision-making on rationality and reason alone might lead to less than
optimal decisions.73
It should be noted that some of the abovementioned critiques were
criticized for presenting a “caricature” of the liberal conception and
disregarding the ways in which many liberal scholars relate to the influence
of personal relations and social connections on personal autonomy. 74
Nonetheless, the critiques of the highly-individualized conception of
autonomy are mostly justified. Although liberal scholars have dealt with
some relational aspects of autonomy, they have indeed failed to
conceptualize the complex connection between persons’ autonomy and

70. See SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 194
(1989); IRIS YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: “THROWING LIKE A GIRL” AND
OTHER ESSAYS (2005); Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 94, 106; Young, supra note 59, at 96-121
(1990).
71. CODE, supra note 63, at 110-72; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 50, 162; Oshana,
supra note 60, at 83-86; Stoljar, supra note 70.
72. Diana Tietjens Meyers, Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood, in
AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 27, 31 (John Christman & Joel
Anderson eds., 2005).
73. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 164-65 (citing ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’
ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (2008)); see also Susan J. Brison,
Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE
SELF, supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that a detachment from one’s body is a symptom of
post-trauma, rather than a healthy decision-making procedure).
74. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 87-88; Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar,
Introduction, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 3, 5.
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their relationships.75 More specifically, most liberal scholars have not
sufficiently addressed the concrete, dynamic ways in which personal
autonomy evolves, develops and changes through the interactions with
others and within the networks of personal and social connections and
relationships. Even Dagan and Dorfman’s account of relational justice,
while indeed tying between relationships and personal autonomy in a more
complex manner than most liberal scholars, does not address the ways in
which autonomous processes are conducted through personal relationships
and interactions. Consequently, and although casting a personal duty to
accommodate others’ choices and respect others’ autonomy, Dagan and
Dorfman as well disregard the active role of others in one’s autonomous
processes and the duties derived from this role. This limits the ability to
articulate a comprehensive legal right to personal autonomy based on its
liberal conception.
B. The Failure to Address Socialization and Its Consequences
Critics of the liberal conception of autonomy have also highlighted
liberal scholarship’s inadequate attention to the problem of socialization.
Philosopher Diana Meyers defines socialization as the delicate social
processes that are hard to notice and pinpoint but nonetheless tremendously
influence a person’s belonging to her community.76 These processes are
embedded in wide social systems and in many social arenas (such as the
family, the workplace, the community, the media, popular culture, and so
on), and formulate one’s preferences, values, beliefs, aspirations, etc.
Socialization is crucial for one’s self-development and autonomy, as it
enables her to situate herself within a specific community and society and
enjoy a feeling of belonging and confidence, while acquiring an education
and absorbing social values.77 One cannot realistically avoid socialization,
and any attempt to avoid it might lead to isolation that infringes
autonomy.78
However, socialization also has some dark sides. Under its influence, it
is hard to distinguish between one’s authentic choices and choices that stem
from coerced adaptation to social norms. Moreover, under strong
socialization persons might choose to live a life that cannot be regarded as
autonomous.79 Socialization might lead a woman, for example, to conform

75. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 95.
76. MEYERS, supra note 10, at 26.
77. Id. at 189-202; Paul Benson, Oppressive Socialization, 17 SOC. THEORY &

PRACTICE 385 (1991).
78. MEYERS, supra note 10, at 189-202.
79. See Benson, supra note 77; Oshana, supra note 60; Stoljar, supra note 70.
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to coercive social norms of feminine beauty,80 to adopt a subservient stance
in her social role as a woman,81 and so on. These aspects of socialization
have served as the basis for critiques on the content neutrality of the
procedural approach to personal autonomy, i.e., its focus on the process
rather than on the process’s outcome.82 Due to content neutrality,
according to the critiques, non-autonomous outcomes might be wrongfully
conceived as autonomous, merely because they are the product of a
reflective process. It should be noted, however, that what is considered a
non-autonomous choice as well as what is considered coercive socialization
are difficult and complex questions. Not surprisingly, even those who
criticize the content neutrality of the procedural approach rarely offer a
conclusive distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous choices
or between benign and coercive socialization.83
Christman offers a defense against the substantive critique of the
procedural account of personal autonomy.84 First, he criticizes the
substantive approach, arguing that it is paternalistic: it coerces specific
values on a person rather than respect her own values and choices.85
Therefore, according to Christman, the substantive approach might infringe
personal autonomy. Second, he argues, if as a part of one’s critical
reflection one critically examines the socialization and specifically the
social norms that led her to formulate specific options and make a specific
choice, she acts autonomously.86 A critical examination of the impact of
socialization includes, inter alia, the ability to imagine a different choice
under different circumstances.87 When one does so, a choice that conforms

80. Benson, supra note 77.
81. Stoljar, supra note 70.
82. The content-neutrality critique is not unique to feminist or relational

scholarship, but is also voiced by liberal scholars who take a substantive approach to
autonomy and object to the content-neutral approaches. See, e.g., Sigurdur Kristinsson,
The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of Autonomy, 30 CAN.
J. PHIL. 257 (2000); Robert Young, Autonomy and Socialization, 89 MIND 356 (1989);
Robert Young, The Value of Autonomy, 32 PHIL. Q. 35 (1982). However, it bears
emphasis that these liberal scholars, like their procedural counterparts, also conceive
personal autonomy as internal and individualistic.
83. See Paul Benson, Free Agency and Self-Worth, 91 J. PHIL. 650 (1994); Stoljar,
supra note 70.
84. Christman, as we have seen above and shall see in further parts of this Article,
is considered a relational scholar. Nonetheless, some parts of his account of personal
autonomy, specifically his approach to socialization, are closer to the liberal conception
of autonomy.
85. Christman, supra note 10, at 158.
86. Id. at 154.
87. Id. at 155; John Christman, Autonomy and Personal History, 21 J. PHIL. 1, 10
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to social norms constitutes an autonomous endorsement of those norms.
Similarly, one can endorse subservient relations, if the endorsement is the
product of an adequate critical reflection on socialization and its
influences.88
The endorsement defense invites further critiques. The assumption that
each person can simply examine her socialization and its consequences is
based on the internal isolated image of the autonomous process, discussed
in the previous Section. It overlooks the ways in which the autonomous
process is embedded in the same connections, relationships and social
norms that are supposed to be critically reflected upon. In other words, the
process itself and the very ability to reflect are tremendously influenced by
socialization. Moreover, the stronger and more coercive the socialization,
the harder it is to notice it and its consequences; and even if it can be
noticed and critically examined, it is extremely hard to resist it. Thinking
of non-resistance to socialization as its autonomous endorsement might
strengthen it and its coercive consequences instead of weakening it and
enabling one to resist it.89
Such an assumption of alleged endorsement of coercive socialization has
also been criticized for leading to the abuse of the concept of free choice in
order to justify women’s social subservience and discrimination. For
instance, the decision of women to be stay-at-home moms and give up their
own careers,90 to apply to less competitive (and less rewarding) jobs,91 or to
stay with their abusive spouses92 — all can be considered autonomous
choices under the procedural content-neutral account. Therefore, all can be
considered as an endorsement of subservient social norms. Of course, at
least some of those choices might be genuinely and authentically
autonomous, but under strong socialization it is hard to tell to what extent
one can critically reflect on one’s socialization — and to what extent one
can resist it.93
Another critique of Christman’s argument that socialization can be
reflected upon addresses the impact of a person’s socioeconomic status on
her ability to conduct any such reflection. To critically reflect on social
(1991); John Christman, Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom, 101 ETHICS 343,
346-47 (1991).
88. Christman, supra note 10, at 154.
89. Andrea C. Westlund, Rethinking Relational Autonomy, 24 HYPATIA 26 (2009).
90. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 37-39 (2000).
91. See Vicky Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
92. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 144.
93. Benson, supra note 77.
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norms, one must be aware of them, recognize them and realize their
consequences. Such awareness might be a privilege of the stronger, more
educated social groups.94 The ability of underprivileged social groups to
recognize socialization and its consequences and include them within the
critical reflective process might be limited (or conceived as limited). A
similar limitation may result from the lack of adequate material resources.95
When a person invests her cognitive and emotional efforts in survival and
obtaining the basic needs for her and her family, she is less able to dedicate
them to conducting reflective processes.96 The liberal conception of
personal autonomy rarely properly addresses these significant aspects of
socialization and a shortage of material resources.97
Now, there is a catch: on the one hand, if we assume that any and every
person can be aware of socialization, then subservient choices made by
members of underprivileged groups might be considered an endorsement of
coercive socialization. This consideration might strengthen those groups’
social marginalization. On the other hand, if we acknowledge their
difficulty in recognizing socialization and critically reflecting upon it, those
groups might be considered non-autonomous, thus justifying a paternalistic
approach towards them. Either way, the liberal procedural content-neutral
account of autonomy infringes the ability of members of such groups to
develop their personal autonomy. Add to that the limited role of the state
under the liberal, individualistic conceptualization of the right to personal
autonomy, and the result is that underprivileged groups are left to deal with
the harmful impacts and consequences of socialization on their own.
The critiques that have been discussed thus far, namely the dominance of
individualism and the failure to address the consequences of socialization
94. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 45-47; Benson, supra note 83, at 654-55. It bears
mention that Friedman takes a procedural approach to autonomy, but adapts it to the
relational conception of autonomy, inter alia by directly addressing the challenges of
socialization. See Marilyn Friedman, Relational Autonomy and Independence, in
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra note 10, at 42.
95. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 18; Carolyn McLeod & Susan Sherwin,
Relational Autonomy, Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who Are Oppressed, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 259, 261; see also Menachem Mautner, A
Liberalism of Flourishing (Nov. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (referring to the centrality of social and material resources in the philosophical
current usually referred to as “liberalism of flourishing” — as opposed to liberalism of
autonomy).
96. See Eldar Shafir, Poverty and Civil Rights: A Behavioral Economics
Perspective, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 206, 213-15 (2014).
97. Raz only briefly and anecdotally mentions the infringement to autonomy
caused when a person needs to focus on her basic survival. See RAZ, supra note 2, at
155; see also A.L.H. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 836
(1979).
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and a shortage of material resources, reveal some of the limitations of the
liberal conception of autonomy as the basis for the right to autonomy. As
mentioned above, a partial and inaccurate conceptualization of personal
autonomy is not merely a theoretical problem, but rather determines the
formulation of legal rights, specifically the right to personal autonomy.
Therefore, an alternative, more adequate theoretical ground is required for
developing the right to personal autonomy. Such is provided by the
relational conception of personal autonomy, which emerged from the
feminist critiques and is further discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY
A. Finding One’s Own Law
Most feminist scholars who have criticized the liberal conception of
personal autonomy have not argued that autonomy should be neglected.98
On the contrary, they have advocated for the intrinsic value of personal
autonomy and shown that women need personal autonomy in order to
define their own lives — lives that are as free as possible from coercion.99
The concept of autonomy is crucial for identifying the causes of women’s
subjection,100 as well as combating them.101 Consequently, out of the
feminist critiques of the liberal conception of personal autonomy, a new
current emerged during the 1980s: relational autonomy. Relational
autonomy has included personal autonomy within the feminist movement,
while adapting it to feminist principles.102 Contrary to the liberal,
individualistic conception of autonomy, the relational conception highlights
the relational nature of persons, and the development of their identity and
autonomy through social connections and relationships with others. Being
a part of relationships and social networks makes all persons
interdependent; however, interdependence does not infringe their
autonomy, but is rather simply an inherent part of their personhood.103
98. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 74, at 3, 5. But see SARA HOAGLAND,
LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE 144-47 (1988) (suggesting that the concept of
autonomy be replaced with the concept of “autokoenony,” i.e., the community-self).
99. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 43-44.
100. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 74, at 3-4.
101. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption and Women, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY, supra note 10, at 35, 47.
102. Id. at 36-37. At about the same time other liberal conceptions, such as justice,
privacy and equality, were criticized by feminist scholars, who suggested their new,
feminist conceptualization. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS (1988) (privacy);
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (justice); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (equality).
103. CODE, supra note 63, at 71-105; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 28; Baier, supra
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According to the relational scholarship, autonomy emerges, develops and
transforms through those relationships and connections, and through a
person’s interactions with other persons, such as family, friends,
community members, employers, colleagues and employees, the state,
public and private institutions, and so on.104
Nedelsky clarifies the significance of relationships by challenging the
basic liberal definition of autonomy as determining one’s own law.
According to Nedelsky, one cannot determine her own law, but rather must
search and find it.105 The law is not formed within the person and she does
not choose it: there is no “menu” of laws. Rather, the self-law is
formulated through a person’s constant understanding of the social
connections, powers and structures, as well as the relationships in which
she is embedded, combined with her constant interaction with other persons
Since relationships and social structures and
and institutions.106
connections are dynamic and change over time, so does one’s own law.
Finding it, according to Nedelsky, is a lifelong dynamic project.107 The
relational account of autonomy, then, does not assume the mere existence
of personal autonomy or a “self-law,” but rather constantly asks how both
are developed, what kind of relationships nurture them, and what kind of
relationships infringe them.108
Several relational scholars have endorsed the procedural account of
personal autonomy, while adapting it to the relational conception of
autonomy. They have included variety of options, the autonomous
reflective process and the competency to act autonomously among the
conditions needed for autonomy, but have also emphasized the role of
relationships in promoting (or withholding) those conditions.109 The
note 60, at 180 (“A person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough
dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons
essentially are second persons, who grow up with other persons.”).
104. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 30-31.
105. Id. at 123-24.
106. Id. at 124. It bears emphasis that this is not a deterministic account, according
to which a person has absolutely no control over her life and choices. On the contrary,
an autonomous person, according to Nedelsky, is a person who can find her own way
in light of her inability to control substantial parts of her life. See id. at 277-306. For
another alternative conception of the autonomous person — as the storyteller of her
own life (rather than the author of her own life), see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION 184-86 (1958). Such a conception also takes into account the other persons
in one’s life, who serve as an audience and as the relational networks within which a
person’s autonomy is developed.
107. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 50, 124.
108. Id. at 278-79.
109. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 15, 65, 103-04; MEYERS, supra note 10.
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reflective process — whether anecdotal or ongoing110 — takes place
through dialogues, deliberations and interactions with others. Similarly,
the competency to act autonomously is learned from others and is
developed through the relationships with them. In the same manner, the
variety of options is formulated and transformed within one’s network of
relationships. The influence is dyadic: one’s relationships with others
affect her personal autonomy, and at the same time one’s personal
autonomy affects her relationships with others. In other words, contrary to
the rather linear, analytic and internal perception of the autonomous
process in liberal scholarship, the relational scholarship perceives it as a
dynamic, fluid and external process. This dynamic process does not mean
that one’s decisions and choices are not her own. Rather, the emphasis is
on the contention that autonomy does not develop in solitary — and the
same is true with regard to the processes through which one makes her
decisions.
It is important to emphasize that relational scholars are extremely careful
not to romanticize connections and relationships. In this regard, they
distinguish themselves from communitarian critics of the liberal conception
of autonomy, who tend to focus mainly on the positive attributes of
communities and their contribution to the development of the self.111
Relational scholars also address the ways in which relationships can harm
autonomy, and vice versa. A person, for instance, may be embedded
within a network of relationships that infringe her personal autonomy. For
this reason, the relational scholarship distinguishes between relationships
that foster autonomy and those that undermine it.112 At the same time, a
person’s self-conception as autonomous may lead her to prefer to leave
certain relationships including, but not limited to, destructive ones. In
addition, the enhancement of one’s autonomy might be conceived as
threatening by other members of her community (or other social group) and
thus lead to her exclusion.113 In any case, the possible tensions between
relationships and personal autonomy do not undermine the relational
account, but merely complicate it.114 Those tensions are conceived as
110. See MEYERS, supra note 10, at 40-48 (distinguishing between episodic
autonomy and programmatic autonomy).
111. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 86; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 32.
112. See infra Section III.B.
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 106.
114. EVELYN FOX KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 112-13 (1985);
NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 52 (demonstrating the tensions between collective and
personal autonomy, and pointing to the contribution of the relational theory to the
conceptualization of those tensions: “It is not that a better framework makes the
puzzles, both theoretical and practical, simply disappear. But they are reconstituted in a
way that makes them productive rather than illogical or simply frustrating.”).
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inherent to the relational conception of personal autonomy and to its
dynamic evolvement and development.115
B. Constructive Relationships as a Necessary Condition for Personal
Autonomy
The centrality of relationships in one’s life has led relational scholars to
add another, crucial condition for the development of personal autonomy:
constructive relationships.116 Constructive relationships are relationships
that enable the development of original thinking, critical competency and
creativity. The interaction of a person with others within constructive
relationships and a supportive environment enables her to develop her
autonomy by observing others, leaning on them, learning from them,
experiencing autonomy with them and practicing it with their help.117
Constructive relationships enhance one’s confidence in herself and in
others, which encourages her to acknowledge her self-worth, formulate her
goals and execute them.118 Constructive relationships, in other words, are
crucial for one’s self-determination. When a child grows up around adults
who are self-confident, she is more likely to become self-confident as well,
especially if her confidence is actively fostered by the adults around her.119
Constructive relationships nurture one’s selfhood and self-worth within the
networks of relationships in which she is embedded; and in turn, one’s
selfhood and self-worth enhance her constructive relationships with others.
115. Friedman, supra note 94, at 60.
116. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 38-41, 46-49. I must emphasize that

Nedelsky explicitly abstains from referring to relationships as a “condition.” Id. at 46.
According to Nedelsky, using the language of conditions might lead to a static and
binary conception of personal autonomy. However, her conceptualization of
relationships that foster autonomy (constructive relationships) is powerful and can
substantially contribute to the development of a relational-procedural account of
personal autonomy. This account, as we shall see in the next Part, contributes to the
relational conceptualization of the legal right to personal autonomy. Therefore, when
discussing constructive relationships as a crucial condition for personal autonomy, I
lean on Nedelsky’s discussion on constructive relationships, while being extremely
careful not to take her conceptualization out of its context. Specifically, in my reference
to relationships as a condition, I maintain their dynamic and evolving nature, which is
central to Nedelsky’s account.
117. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 15, 65; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 55.
118. Benson, supra 83.
119. See, e.g., Inge Seiffge-Krenke & Vilmante Pakalniskiene, Who Shapes Whom
in the Family: Reciprocal Links Between Autonomy Support in the Family and Parents’
and Adolescents’ Coping Behaviors, 40 J. YOUTH & CHILD. 983 (2011); Laura WrayLake, Ann C. Crouter & Susan M. McHale, Developmental Patterns in DecisionMaking Autonomy Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence: European American
Parents’ Perspectives, 81 CHILD DEV. 636 (2010).
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Through constructive interactions, one can discover new areas of interest,
her preferences change, and her abilities to be innovative and creative are
enhanced. All of these, in turn, enhance the constructive nature of existing
relationships and enable her to develop new ones. Hence, the connection
between constructive relationships and personal autonomy is of a
reinforcing nature: constructive relationships serve as a crucial basic
condition for the development of personal autonomy, and personal
autonomy contributes to the enhancement and development of constructive
relationships. This reinforcing nature is a prominent feature of the
relational account of personal autonomy.
The influence of constructive relationships on personal autonomy is also
apparent with regard to the autonomous critical reflective process. The
reflective process improves if conducted through constructive dialogues
and interactions with others.120 Deliberations with one’s spouse, parents,
other family members, colleagues and friends enable her to identify more
clearly her desires, considerations and preferences. In some cases, the
mere need to explain a certain preference or choice to others helps a person
articulate it more precisely. The explanation of choices thus promotes a
more accurate and substantial reflective process than when it is conducted
alone. Moreover, the dialogue with others gives them a chance to suggest
new considerations, options and perspectives, which may be crucial for the
reflective process, whether regarding a concrete urgent decision or a longterm life-plan. Such an influence is also reinforcing by nature: the
deliberative constructive process and the personal autonomy that is
nurtured within it in turn enhance the relationships themselves.
Conversely, destructive relationships might infringe autonomy. Such
relationships are characterized by coercion, exploitation, oppression,
violence and self-deprecation. Therefore, according to Nedelsky, although
relationships are considered central to the relational account of autonomy,
its main purpose is not to preserve existing relationships at any cost, but
rather to evaluate whether certain relationships are constructive or
destructive.121 Destructive relationships limit one’s ability to formulate an
adequate variety of options, reduce the likelihood of a constructive
deliberative reflective process, and diminish one’s confidence and selfworth. Moreover, destructive relationships restrict a person’s ability to
develop alternative, constructive ones. For instance, it is rather difficult for
battered wives to develop social relationships outside their homes, and thus
they suffer not only from the violence itself, but also from isolation.122
120. See Andrea C. Westlund, Autonomy and Self-Care, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra 10, at 181.
121. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 32, 122-23.
122. Jan Bostock, Maureen Plumpton & Rebekah Pratt, Domestic Violence Against
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This isolation prevents them from strengthening their personal autonomy
through constructive relationships with others, making it even harder for
them to leave the destructive, violent relationship. Clearly, the reinforcing
nature of the connection between relationships and personal autonomy can
be negative as well as positive.
Destructive relationships are not only interpersonal, but may exist in
other, broader social contexts, such as cultural or religious conservative
communities and societies. The question whether the relationships within a
conservative community infringe or enhance one’s autonomy is constantly
debated in academia as well as in political discourses. On the one hand,
such communities tend to provide their members with a wide and strong
safety net, which fosters their confidence in themselves and in others,
enables them to develop constructive relationships, and promotes their
personal autonomy.123 Putting aside the extreme cases of cults, most
conservative communities do not tend to forcefully oppress their members
and negate their selfhood and autonomy. On the other hand, in many cases
— not just the extreme — belonging to a conservative community might
limit a person’s variety of options and her chances of practicing
autonomy.124 Moreover, the relationships within conservative communities
might be oppressive and subservient in part, i.e., they might be destructive
and infringe the ability of the community members to develop their
personal autonomy.
Nonetheless, relational scholars are careful not to assume that persons
who are embedded within destructive relationships are not autonomous at
all. Such persons’ autonomy is most likely diminished, but not annulled,
since personal autonomy is not binary, but rather a matter of degree.125
Accordingly, every person can autonomously choose to leave destructive
relationships or a destructive community. However, relational scholars are
also aware of the difficulties in identifying the destructive nature of such
relationships, specifically the difficulty of leaving them. First, as discussed
above, the limited autonomy within such relationships restricts the ability
to critically evaluate them.126 Such an evaluation takes place within the
community itself, in light of its values and norms, and through the
Women: Understanding Social Processes and Women’s Experiences, 19 J. COMMUNITY
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 95, 99 (2009).
123. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY 265 (1986); MEYERS, supra note 10, at 26 (referring to the bright sides
of socialization); see also NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 125 (referring to a legitimate
framework of collective force).
124. Christman, supra note 10, at 154.
125. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 104.
126. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text; see also Oshana, supra note 60.
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interaction with its members. Therefore, if the communal relationships are
oppressive and coercive, such an evaluation is substantially limited. Here,
again, we see the negative impact of the reinforcing nature of relational
autonomy. Moreover, the relational theory explicitly addresses the costs of
leaving a community — even a coercive one. Besides the material
resources that are needed to start a new life outside the community, in
many cases leaving it also means leaving behind family and friends. From a
relational perspective, these costs are extremely high.127
To conclude, the relational scholarship attributes great significance to the
existence of constructive relationships in one’s life, and addresses the
impacts of destructive relationships. It conceives personal autonomy and
the autonomous process as a major way to evaluate relationships and
forsake destructive ones, though it acknowledges the limited ability to
conduct such an evaluation and leave such relationships. The ongoing and
reinforcing connection between relationships and personal autonomy —
whether positive or negative by nature — stands at the heart of the
relational account of personal autonomy.
C. The Synergy Between Individuality and Relationships
Alongside the centrality of relationships, most relational scholars have
not neglected the individualistic character of the autonomous person and
personal autonomy.128 This focus does not entail a return to the liberal
internal abstract conception of personal autonomy. Rather, the relational
authors point to the inherent connection between one’s individuality and
her relationships with others, as well as to their interdependence and
mutual constructiveness. Individuality evolves and develops within one’s
relationships and, at the same time, (constructive) relationships can be
developed and fostered only between distinct individuals. Similarly, as
Nedelsky points out, a person’s selfhood and autonomy evolve and are
transformed through her relations with her community, and the community
is transformed and changes through the choices of the individuals who
constitute it.129 In other words, one’s individuality and relationships are
synergic and reinforcing; and this synergy is what enables the development

127. In the next Part, we shall see how the relational perspective is translated to a
duty of the state to promote the personal autonomy of persons trapped in oppressive
relationships. See infra Section IV.C.
128. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 116-17; NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at
21, 52; Christman, supra note 10; Catriona Mackenzie, Three Dimensions of
Autonomy: A Relational Analysis, in AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra 10,
at 15; see also Elizabeth Anderson, Towards a Non-Ideal, Relational Methodology for
Political Philosophy, 24 HYPATIA 132 (2009).
129. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 21.
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of one’s personal autonomy.
Note that Nedelsky declares that she prioritizes relationships over
individuality, for two reasons: first, she contends that relationship networks
constitute a major part of all individuals, and hence theorizing relationships
is sufficient for the conceptualization of personal autonomy and the
Second, she argues that the
individual autonomous person.130
individualistic character of personal autonomy still prevails in the
scholarship on autonomy, and therefore a preference for its relational
aspects is required.131 Nonetheless, she attributes major significance to a
person’s individuality and distinctiveness from others, and not just to
relationships.132 Nedelsky clarifies that conceptualizing autonomy in
relational terms does not entail the subjugation of a person to a collective,
such as the family, the community, or the nation.133 Personal autonomy
evolves within those relationships, but a person is not merged into them.
Friedman points out another aspect of the synergic connection between
autonomy and relationships through her discussion on autonomy within
romantic love. She begins by denying the notion that romantic love
inherently merges both partners into a single entity and negates their
individuality.134 Such a conception of romantic relationships leans on the
contradiction between individuality and relationships, and it prevails in
Western cultures, albeit mostly metaphorically.135 Instead, Friedman
suggests that we should perceive romantic love as creating a third entity:
beside the distinct partners, there is also a romantic merger.136 Both
partners constitute the third entity, but, at the same time, it is separate from
them. All three entities (both individual lovers and the romantic merger)
interact with each other, change each other, and are transformed in light of
each other. Within this dynamic interaction, the personal autonomy of each
partner develops in a way that ties both partners together, yet maintains
their individuality and distinctiveness.137

130. Id. at 30.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 35-36 (“I embrace the notion of the unique, infinite value of each

individual, and the value of interiority, and the value of the ability of individuals to
shape their own lives.”).
133. Id. at 86.
134. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 116-17.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 117-20.
137. Needless to say, Friedman does not attribute only positive facets to romantic
relationships, but also addresses their inherent tensions and the ways in which they
might infringe autonomy and individuality. See id. at 120, 127-29. Like other relational
scholars, Friedman perceives such tensions as an inherent part of the relational
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D. The Multidimensional Self
Having discussed the importance of constructive relationships and of
individuality, I now turn to discuss another aspect of the relational
conception of personal autonomy: the significance it attributes to the body
and to emotions. This significance is analyzed here through the concept of
the multidimensional self, as developed by Nedelsky. Contrary to the
liberal abstract and monolithic conception of the person, Nedelsky portrays
the person as multidimensional.138 Along with her intellect and reason, a
person has myriad dimensions that characterize her, including her sex,
gender, color, ethnicity, body size, nature, emotions, religion, etc.139 All of
them constitute inherent parts of the person’s selfhood, make her unique
and distinct from others; and at the same time, they shape and construct her
relationships with others. The complexity of a person, according to
Nedelsky, is what constitutes her creative interactions with others, and
personal autonomy is a part of this creative interaction.140 Any account that
ignores the myriad dimensions of a person conceptualizes personhood and
autonomy in a partial, superficial and inaccurate manner.
Other relational scholars as well place special emphasis on the physical
and emotional dimensions of the self. Meyers, for example, criticizes the
exclusion from the liberal scholarship of a person’s self-perception as being
embodied. She shows that the body is a crucial part of one’s identity and
selfhood, and thus has a tremendous impact on the development of one’s
autonomy.141 The body can limit the ability to act autonomously (e.g.,
when sick, weak or disabled), but it can also enhance one’s autonomy.
Meyers demonstrates the ability of the body to enhance one’s autonomy
quite interestingly: when a person is in danger or going through an
emergency crisis, the body reacts by releasing the hormone adrenaline.
This adrenal reaction is what enables a person to gather her strength and
overcome the crisis in a way that would not necessarily be possible with the
mere power of mind and intellect.142 This practical example clarifies the

conceptualization of personal autonomy.
138. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 158-73.
139. Id.; see also Christman, supra note 10, at 147.
140. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 158.
141. Meyers, supra note 72, at 31.
142. Id. at 33-34. Meyers presents this example by telling a personal story about her
own physical experience, through which she learned about herself and personal
autonomy. While hiking alone, Meyers fell and broke her wrists; nevertheless, she
managed to reach a safe place and receive medical treatment. She describes the way her
body reacted to the emergency and enabled her to cope with it. The way Meyers uses
this personal physical experience as a way of learning and developing a theoretical
notion emphasizes even more the significant role she attributes to the body as a source
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importance of one’s body for her competency to act autonomously. It also
highlights the strong interdependence between one’s body and mind: the
body cannot function without the mind, and the mind cannot function
without the body.143 Together, they enable a person to act autonomously
and develop her personal autonomy.
A person’s emotions constitute another important dimension of the
multidimensional self. Contrary to the liberal conception of feelings and
emotions as contradicting reason and rationality — and possibly distorting
one’s realistic perception and observation — philosopher Christin Tappolet
has analyzed their crucial evaluative role.144 Emotions — and not only
reasonable thinking — enable a person to be aware of important
considerations and aspects when going through autonomous processes.145
Moreover, Tappolet emphasizes that feelings and emotions are not only
internal, but rather constitute a major part of one’s relationships with
others. Love, anger, disappointment, sadness, happiness, etc. — all take
part in forming one’s personal relations, constitute them and transform
them.146 Therefore, all have a direct impact on the development of one’s
personal autonomy. Tappolet admits that there are situations in which
feelings and emotions do distort the conception of reality and thus might
infringe one’s ability to act autonomously, but she does not find such
occurrences to justify the complete disregard and exclusion of emotions
from the conceptualization of personal autonomy. Her contention is even
more powerful if we keep in mind that the intellect as well can lead to a
distorted conception of reality, given possible cognitive biases.147 Both
intellect and emotions, therefore, play a crucial part in evaluating reality,
and both are required to improve autonomous processes. Both intellect and
emotions, according to the relational account of personal autonomy,
constitute a part of a person’s reason and rationality, and both are
considered major sources of knowledge.148

of both personal autonomy and knowledge.
143. Id. at 49.
144. Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Reasons, and Autonomy, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER, supra note 10, at 163, 172.
145. Id. at 177, 178.
146. Id. at 181.
147. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
148. See NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 164-66; Meyers, supra note 72; Tappolet,
supra note 144.
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V. A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY:
THE STATE’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
The previous Part stressed the synergic integrations between the mind
and the body, between emotions and intellect, and between individuality
and relationships, which form the relational conception of personal
autonomy. This synergy overcomes many of the flaws of the liberal
conception of autonomy, which were discussed in Part II above, and can
therefore serve as a more adequate basis for articulating the legal right to
personal autonomy. It provides a complex, rich conceptualization of
personhood and autonomy and enables a more precise articulation of the
right to personal autonomy and of the state’s duty to fulfill it. Moreover,
acknowledging the role of other people and institutions in the development
of one’s autonomy — the state being one of those “others” — makes it
simpler to advance the state’s responsibility for the personal autonomy of
its citizens. Lastly, the relational approach takes socialization and its
consequences seriously and does not assume that each person can
overcome them on her own; this facilitates a discussion on the
responsibility of the state to address them, at least partially. In other words,
although the scholars who developed the relational conception of autonomy
have not conceptualized personal autonomy as a legal right, their
conceptualizations nonetheless can serve as a sound basis for the right to
personal autonomy.
Certainly, the relational conception has its own flaws, some of which
have been discussed above. One such flaw, which should be considered
seriously when articulating the right to personal autonomy based on
relational grounds, is the relational account’s tendency toward overparticularization.149 This over-particularization, as Christman argues,
might make it rather difficult to use the relational account of personal
autonomy for further developing a normative model of autonomy. 150 The
myriad dimensions of the self, the dynamic nature of relationships, the
focus on the differences between people rather than their similarities — all
pose challenges to the goal of articulating personal autonomy as a broad
legal right. Therefore, the right to personal autonomy must be flexible
enough to promote the personal autonomy of all members of a society,
despite the apparent differences between them.151
In this Part, I suggest some preliminary foundations for such an
articulation of the right to personal autonomy. Section A addresses the

149. See Christman, supra note 10, at 145.
150. Id.
151. On promoting equality in light of the differentiation between multidimensional

individuals, see NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 186-89.
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state’s duty to promote constructive relationships between state institutions
and the recipients of their services. Section B turns to examine the state’s
responsibility for constructive relations between people and private (or
semi-private) institutions. Section C focuses on the need to prevent
destructive relationships. Section D turns to the responsibility of the state
to address the consequences of coercive socialization. Lastly, in Section E,
I address a possible consequence of the relational framework I suggest: the
growing intervention of the state in people’s lives.
A. Relationships Provided by the State
A substantial part of the legal right to personal autonomy, when
conceptualized in relational terms, is the state’s responsibility for ensuring
the existence of constructive relationships in its citizens’ lives. It bears
emphasis that in most cases, the state is not responsible for providing its
citizens with relationships per se; such a responsibility is quite rare.
Rather, as we shall see in the following sections, the state’s responsibility is
usually to ensure that existing relationships are constructive enough,
enhance the constructiveness of such relationships, fix destructive ones (if
possible), and help persons leave undesired destructive relationships.
Nonetheless, some relationships are indeed provided by the state itself:
such are, for example, the relationships within public educational
institutions, and between welfare institutions and the recipients of their
services.
Under a relational conceptualization of the state’s duty to promote
personal autonomy, it is not enough to supervise the adequacy of schools’
pedagogic contents, and it is not enough to provide welfare recipients with
material necessities. These are, of course, very important for the ability to
lead an autonomous life and develop one’s autonomy, but they are not
sufficient. The relational approach also insists on ensuring that the
relationships within those institutions are constructive. The relationships
between children and teachers should foster and nurture children’s personal
autonomy.
Similarly, although the relationships between welfare
institutions and the recipients of their services are hierarchal by nature and
based on dependency, it does not mean they should necessarily be
paternalistic, as they are usually perceived (and tend to be).152 Instead,
according to the relational account of personal autonomy, such
relationships can and should foster autonomy not only despite the inherent
dependency they constitute, but also through this dependency.
Christman demonstrates the connection between dependency and

152. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 39, 67, 140.
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autonomy by criticizing U.S. welfare programs.153 He shows that the
contrast between autonomy and dependency, which prevails under the
liberal conception of personal autonomy, results in inadequate welfare
programs. Such programs aim at reducing the recipients’ dependency on
the state and promoting their independence by cutting their financial
support and encouraging them to find a job. Such policies, however, as
Christman argues, although allegedly constructed to promote the recipients’
autonomy, actually infringe it. Leaving the welfare recipients to cope alone
with the lack of income makes it harder for them to develop their
autonomy. An alternative, relational construction of welfare programs,
according to Christman, should be based on the dependency of the
recipients, and promote their autonomy through it. Mainly, he calls for
combining direct financial support with active personal assistance in the
process of finding a job. Active personal assistance creates opportunities
for constructive relations, specifically for conducting joint deliberative
reflective processes. Designing welfare programs in a deliberative and
reflective manner can raise the recipients’ confidence and self-esteem and
provide them with opportunities to practice autonomy with professional,
relational assistance. Such reforms are more likely to enhance the
recipients’ autonomy than independence-based ones.
Another interesting example of state-fostered constructive relationships
through which one’s personal autonomy can thrive is an Israeli case where
it was necessary to appoint a guardian for an incapable woman.154 In the
this case, which concerned a seventy-eight-year-old woman suffering from
occasional episodes of dementia, a family court judge decided not to
appoint her a regular guardian. Instead, a good friend of hers was
appointed as a “decision-making supporter.”155 By appointing a decisionmaking supporter the family court promoted the woman’s autonomy
through her dependence on her friend, while avoiding the paternalistic
nature of guardianship. It enabled the woman to continue navigating her
own life, while being assisted and accompanied for this purpose. It leaned
on the constructive relationship between both women, gave it legal
153. Christman, supra note 66.
154. Guardianship Case 43640-01-15 Doe v. N. County Gen. Admin. (Apr. 8, 2015)

(unpublished) (Isr.).
155. The judge mentioned that the decision-making supporter conforms to the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). Although the
relationship between both women existed before it was legally acknowledged, I
consider it to be state-fostered, as this official appointment has a substantial impact on
both women’s legal authorization in several contexts. For an analysis of the decisionmaking supporter model, see Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T.
Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1111 (2012).
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recognition, and enabled the women to strengthen their relationship and its
constructiveness even more, thus enhancing the personal autonomy of both
of them. About a year after this case, the Israeli Parliament amended the
Legal Capacity and Guardianship Act by formally adding the option to
appoint a decision-making supporter instead of a regular guardian.156
There are several ways, then, in which the state can provide its citizens
with constructive relationships through which their autonomy can thrive.
In keeping with the relational approach, however, I am very careful not to
romanticize relationships, nor to assume that the state’s power to provide
constructive relationships is unlimited. Paternalism, oppression and
exploitation might characterize the relationships provided by the state, even
when it makes an effort to formulate them as autonomy-enhancing
relationships. Moreover, the dynamic nature of relationships makes it
rather difficult to regulate them, supervise them, or ensure that they are
indeed constructive.
Nevertheless, ignoring the significance of
constructive relationships and adhering solely to the liberal
conceptualization of the right to autonomy might place much stricter limits
on the ability to promote personal autonomy through legal and public
policies. Policymakers should consider both the strengths and possible
flaws of the relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy
when articulating this right in different contexts and cases.
B. Relationships Within Private or Semi-Private Institutions
Another kind of relationships that the state should ensure their
constructiveness are those taking place within private or semi-private
institutions, such as hospitals. In the private and semi-private context, we
should recall the dual duty of the state in promoting its citizens’ autonomy:
the responsibility can be imposed directly on the state, as seen in the
previous Section, or it can be placed on other entities, individuals and
institutions. In the latter case, the state’s responsibility is to articulate and
enforce the rules that ensure that those institutions promote the citizens’
autonomy. The case of informed consent serves as a good example of the
second kind of state responsibility. As discussed above, from a liberal
point of view, obtaining one’s informed consent by clearly stressing the
variety of possible treatments and letting her choose the most preferable
option is perceived as enhancing one’s autonomy and fulfilling her right to
personal autonomy.157 The duty imposed by the informed consent doctrine
does not include, however, a duty to actively support the patient throughout

156. Legal Capacity and Guardianship Act (Amendment No. 18), 5776-2016, SH
No. 2550 p. 798 (Isr.).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
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the process of making her decision. Although hospitals may do so
voluntarily,158 the legal obligation requires only the disclosure of the full
information needed for the consent to be informed.159
There is no doubt, of course, that disclosing the full information is
essential for the patient’s autonomy, but the relational approach would not
find it sufficient. The focus on information leans on the liberal assumption
that once a patient has full information, she can independently, critically,
and reflectively weigh all options and choose the one she prefers. Such an
assumption ignores the tremendous effect one’s bodily and emotional
conditions have on her ability to conduct an independent process.160
Contrarily, as discussed above, the relational approach rejects the notion of
an internal decision-making process and points to the advantages of
deliberative processes and to the integration of the body and emotions into
the process. Accordingly, under a relational conceptualization of the right
to personal autonomy, the duty to obtain the patient’s informed consent
should also include providing sufficient consultation and assistance in the
process of decision-making. More generally, a relational approach would
emphasize the need for maintaining constructive relationships between the
patients and the medical staff. Constructive relationships and an assisted
deliberative process not only improve the patient’s ability to reach an
autonomous concrete decision, but also enhance her confidence in herself
and in her caretakers, provide her with a chance to practice autonomous
decision-making — and enhance her personal autonomy.
Some scholars and courts have indeed advocated an expansion of the
informed-consent doctrine to include a substantive dialogue between the
patient and the physician.161 One legal scholar, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, has

158. See, e.g., Erik Falkum & Reidun Førde, Paternalism, Patient Autonomy, and
Moral Deliberation in the Physician-Patient Relationship: Attitudes Among Norwegian
Physicians, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 239 (2001).
159. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12; Nadia N. Sawicki, Patient Protection and
Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory and Tort Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621
(2012) (“Unlike the traditional informed consent process, which is highly regulated and
governed by decades of common law, the creation and use of decision-support tools is
currently controlled only by market forces. No administrative regulations exist to
delineate the appropriate scope of decision aids . . . .”). In Israel, see Patient’s Rights
Law, § 13(b) (“For receiving an informed consent, the physician is required to deliver
the patient the medical information needed for him to decide if he consents to the
suggested treatment.”).
160. And if not ignored, the bodily and emotional conditions might lead to
justifying a paternalistic approach towards the patient.
161. See Peter Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-04
(1994) (referring to such advocators as “idealists,” as opposed to “realists” who
highlight the barriers to and costs of expanding the informed-consent doctrine).
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recently linked such a deliberative approach to informed consent to the
relational conception of personal autonomy.162 However, her discussion
focuses exclusively on reproductive decisions, related to abortions, fertility
treatments, and medical care during pregnancy. According to LauferUkeles, physicians’ deliberative assistance in the decision-making process
is crucial for such decisions, since they are complex and involve significant
identity-related aspects: the choice whether or not to become a mother, the
preferred way of giving birth, etc. Laufer-Ukeles argues that for such
decisions just the information on the various available options is not
enough.163 Obviously, I agree with Laufer-Ukeles regarding the need to
incorporate a duty to provide deliberative assistance into the informedconsent doctrine. However, I do not think that it should be restricted to
reproductive decisions, nor to identity-related ones. In my opinion, an
assisted deliberative decision-making process is necessary for other
substantial medical decisions as well, in order to promote patients’
autonomy.164 Such a contention has been voiced by philosopher Natalie
Stoljar.165 Stoljar, like other philosophers who write on relational
autonomy, does not articulate autonomy as a legal right, nor does she
discuss the duty of the state to promote it. Nonetheless, she does point out
that the relational conception of autonomy highlights the insufficiency of
information disclosure and the consequent need for an assisted deliberative
process when making medical decisions.
It bears mention that a duty to provide substantial deliberative decisionmaking assistance for all (or most) patients is costly, and might impose a
heavy (possibly too heavy) burden on hospitals and physicians.166 It might
also make medical treatment more expensive and thus less accessible to the
poor. One possible reply to the budgetary challenge may be broadening the
state’s responsibility to include not only the duty to formulate and enforce
the legal rule, but also to subsidize — at least partially — its costs.167
Another reply is that maintaining constructive relationships between
162. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12.
163. Id. at 604, 606, 611 (criticizing especially the practice of providing such

information via pamphlets).
164. A big question is, of course, what are considered “substantial medical
decisions.” This question should be debated and decided by policymakers.
165. Stoljar, supra note 60.
166. See Shuck, supra note 161.
167. I find it important to emphasize again that this Article uses informed consent
as an example, and does not aim at providing a thorough analysis of the doctrine.
Future research should further develop the theoretical and practical connections
between informed consent and the relational conception of personal autonomy, while
discussing both the advantages and costs of conceptualizing informed consent in
relational terms.
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patients and hospital personnel most likely would lessen the chances of a
hospital being sued. Providing substantial deliberative decision-making
assistance maintains constructive relationships between patients and
hospital personnel. This, in turn, mitigates costs, since more constructive
relationships increase the ability to obtain genuine informed consent and
reduce the likelihood of a patient filing a lawsuit.168 In other words, the
costs of improving the constructiveness of the relationships in the hospitals
and providing personal assistance in the process of decision-making might
be balanced by a reduction in legal expenses, and can be covered, at least
partially, by the state.
C. The Prevention of Destructive Relationships
A third aspect of the state’s duty to ensure that its citizens are provided
with constructive relationships is the prevention of destructive ones. A
prominent example of the state’s duty is the prevention of violence in
general, domestic violence in particular. Domestic violence diminishes
one’s autonomy in several ways: it impairs her bodily integrity, as well as
her self-esteem and self-confidence; it deprives her of constructive relations
within her own home; and it usually prevents her from developing
alternative constructive relationships outside her home.169 Friedman further
explains that violent relationships compel women to focus on their safety
and survival,170 thus making it difficult for a woman to invest her cognitive
and emotional resources in developing her personal autonomy and
conducting autonomous reflective processes. Moreover, according to
Friedman, battered women — as a part of their efforts to survive — tend to
prefer their spouses’ volitions and preferences, putting aside their own.171
Such a preference impairs women’s autonomy in a way similar to
manipulation and coercion, and causes their distinct personalities to merge
within their spouses’ personalities. Lastly, in many cases violent
relationships enfold within them strict control and supervision by the men
168. See Kristin E. Schleiter, Difficult Patient-Physician Relationships and the Risk
of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 242, 242 (2009)
(“The impact of poor communication skills increases the likelihood that patients with
adverse outcomes will sue, whether or not an error has occurred.”).
169. Since more women than men are abused by their spouses, my discussion in
this Section focuses on women; nonetheless, it is applicable to male victims as well. On
domestic violence against men, see, for example, PHILIP W. COOK, ABUSED MEN: THE
HIDDEN SIDE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009); Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for
Acknowledging Women’s Acts of Violence, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287 (2016); and
Christopher F. Barber, Domestic Violence Against Men, NURSING STANDARD, Aug. 27,
2008, at 3.
170. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 142.
171. Id.
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over their wives’ lives.
Most Western states acknowledge the severe problem of domestic
violence and are engaged in developing legal and public policies to cope
with it. Nonetheless, as some relational scholars point out, such policies
are usually of a paternalistic nature.172 Moreover, many policies involve
taking the victim away from her home and community in order to protect
her. Although such protection is necessary, it can help the woman only
partially in redeveloping her autonomy. Contrarily, a relational articulation
of the state’s duty in the context of facilitating a woman’s ability to
redevelop her autonomy would also focus on the need to help the victim
develop new constructive relationships or enhance the constructiveness of
existing ones.173 For example, it would emphasize the need to provide her
with a supporting network following her removal from her home, so she
does not remain isolated. Such a policy would improve her chances of
restoring and enhancing her personal autonomy.
An interesting example of the difference between relational and
paternalistic policies regarding domestic violence is found in Nancy
Fraser’s article from 1989 on the politicization of needs in general,
women’s needs in particular.174 Fraser describes the establishment and
management of shelters for battered women by feminist activists in the
United States during the 1970s. A few years after those shelters were
established, the government and local municipalities acknowledged the
problem and began funding and supporting the shelters. The move toward
funding was a remarkable feminist achievement, as it signaled the move
from viewing domestic violence as a private issue to addressing it as a
political, public phenomenon. However, the governmental support, as
described by Fraser, was accompanied by a sharp change in the way the
shelters were run. When feminist activists ran the shelters, major emphasis
was placed on enhancing the constructive relationships between the tenants
of the shelters and the shelters’ staff (some of the staff were women who
themselves suffered from domestic violence). In addition, an inherent part
of the help given to women in the shelters was assistance in finding an
alternative residence and workplace and in developing new, constructive
networks of relationships. Contrarily, under state funding and management
of the shelters, a professional discourse took over, and a psychological,
psychiatric, hierarchical, and paternalistic approach was implemented in
the shelters. Instead of helping women to thrive as a part of a community,
172. See, e.g., NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 213.
173. See id. at 213 (“If we are to stop violence against women we will have to think

differently about the task of law and the state.”).
174. Nancy Fraser, Talking About Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political
Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 ETHICS 291, 308-10 (1989).
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the shelters personnel treated women as therapeutic objects. From a
relational perspective, although such therapy may indeed be very helpful
for reconstructing women’s lives, it is not enough for redeveloping and
enhancing their personal autonomy.
The contradiction described by Fraser, between the aspiration to
redevelop women’s autonomy through constructive relationships and the
paternalistic approach of the state, is central to our discussion on the state’s
responsibility for the development of personal autonomy. Specifically, it
highlights the need to develop a public policy that is not based on a
paternalistic approach towards battered women, but rather focuses on the
need to enhance women’s autonomy. The relational approach, which
characterized the shelters when they were run by feminist activists, can also
be implemented by the state. The state can provide women with support
systems, through which they can redevelop their autonomy, while
establishing constructive — rather than paternalistic — relationships
between the women and the state’s agents. The state can also actively
assist women in finding a new workplace and residence, enabling them to
reconstruct their families and keep raising their children. Lastly, it can
enhance women’s economic autonomy by providing or subsidizing
adequate programs to assist women.175 Those strategies can accompany
(yet not replace) the policies that aim to protect women’s lives and safety.
D. Addressing Coercive Socialization
The need to deal with destructive relationships is also apparent in cases
of coercive socialization. The state’s role in this regard might be rather
vague since, as explained above, there are no clear criteria for
distinguishing between the oppressive (or coercive) and benign
consequences of socialization.176 The state cannot — and should not —
aim at eliminating all sorts and forms of socialization. Any attempt to
overcome all social and cultural influences is doomed to fail. However, the
relational account of personal autonomy does acknowledge that it might be
difficult for a person to critically examine by herself the impacts and
consequences of socialization, or resist them. The state and its agents may
be in a better (albeit not perfect) position to identify oppressive
socialization in various contexts, address it or prevent it. An interesting
example is found in section 6C2 of the Israeli Equal Rights for Women
Law, which requires legislators to consider the possible impacts of each bill

175. See, e.g., AMY CORREIA, PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
STRATEGIES TO EXPAND BATTERED WOMEN’S ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES (2000),
http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/BCS9_EO.pdf.
176. See supra Section II.B.
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on the social status of women.177 This section requires the state to prevent
in advance at least some of the negative consequences of gender-related
socialization in concrete contexts. This, in turn, can help mitigating
oppressive socialization in broader social contexts and eventually
eliminating at lease some coercive social norms.
Moreover, state authorities and institutions have the power to assist
persons who are subjected to oppressive socialization to leave such
relationships and develop alternative, constructive ones. An apparent
example is the case of conservative communities, which was discussed
above.178 The state and its agents can assist individuals within such
communities to decide whether they wish to stay or leave. The state can
also regulate, at least partially, the relationships within such communities,
and enforce policies aimed at reducing the impacts of socialization,
strengthening constructive relationships within the communities, and
promoting the members’ personal autonomy.179 However, here as well, it
bears emphasis that the power of the state is limited. Some communities
and cultural groups are too conservative and segregated for the state to be
able to deal with the powerful socialization within them. It is also
extremely difficult to regulate the relationships within such communities
given the tendency of many Western states not to interfere with them, due
to multicultural considerations.180
It should be noted that not all policymakers would be willing to reject
policies and laws that might have such problematic consequences or to
regulate relationships within segregated communities. There are various
reasons for such unwillingness: identification with conservative
perceptions, political considerations, an inability to confront powerful
social groups and actors, etc. In fact, the state itself serves in many cases
as a prominent agent of coercive socialization. Such is, for example, the
limitations placed upon women’s right to have an abortion. Recent
legislative developments in some U.S. states (as the 2013 Texas regulation
on abortion clinics) restrict the availability of abortions for many women.
Such policies infringe women’s autonomy, both by narrowing their variety
of options (i.e., to abort or to keep the pregnancy) and by strengthening the
social conception of motherhood as women’s primary social role. At the
177. Equal Rights for Women Law, 5711-1951, § 6C2, 5 LSI 171 (as amended)

(Isr.).
178. See supra Section II.B.
179. Another example, which I intend to develop in future papers, is regulating the

relationships between spouses in a manner that encourages the promotion of their
constructive relationships and consequently of their personal autonomy within the
family.
180. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTION (2001).
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same time, as explained by Laufer-Ukeles, from a relational point of view,
at least some policies that are considered pro-life and anti-abortion (such as
the duty to consult) can actually promote women’s autonomy, if
implemented correctly.181 I intend to further develop the relational
discussion on abortions in another paper. What the current discussion has
made clear, however, is the need to pay careful attention to the
relationships between the state and the individuals whose autonomy it has a
responsibility to promote.
E. A Possible Critique: Autonomous Individuals and the State
The previous Sections address several aspects of a state’s responsibility
to promote its citizens’ personal autonomy. We have seen that on the one
hand, the state can promote constructive relationships among individuals,
as well as between individuals and public or semi-public institutions. It can
also prevent destructive relationships and address the influence of coercive
socialization. On the other hand, we have also seen that the state itself can
be the source of paternalistic (or even destructive) relationships, and serve
as an agent of coercive socialization. Moreover, charging the state with a
responsibility to promote individuals’ autonomy — specifically the
responsibility for the constructive relationships in people’s lives — raises
the concern of massive state intervention within the private sphere. The
juxtaposition of the potential for paternalistic and coercive relations
between the state and its citizens and the concern of massive intervention
leads to a possible critique of the policy set forth in this Article: that it
would eventually infringe people’s autonomy instead of enhancing it.
This concern is not unjustified. Nedelsky herself admits that a relational
articulation of legal rights and rules might indeed lead to the expansion of
the state’s presence in private lives and strengthen the coercive power of
the collective over the individual.182 Nedelsky ties this possible critique to
another one: the risks that may emerge from forgoing the concept of
borders. According to Nedelsky, rights and legal rules should be
formulated and conceptualized in terms of relationships rather than borders.
In many instances, however, such borders seem to be crucial, as in the case
181. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12, at 591; cf. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE ch. 2 (1982) (arguing that the individualistic conception of women’s decisionmaking process regarding abortions misconceives the way women actually make such a
decision; and, more significantly, that an individualistic, either/or conception of that
process results in women perceiving themselves as either selfish or victims, rather than
autonomous agents).
182. NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 202. As emphasized by her and by other
relational scholars, besides the importance of relationships for one’s autonomy, an
individual also needs to be protected from a possible collective coercive power. Id. at
86.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

39

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

150

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 25:2

of legal rules aimed at protecting people from violence. In the relational
framework context, Nedelsky points to an inherent contradiction between
the relational conception of autonomy and the feminist intuition, which
highlights the importance of borders for maintaining people’s — especially
women’s — safety. Through the example of violence against women,
Nedelsky examines both possible critiques: the risks of forgoing the
concept of borders and the fear of enhancing the state’s power within the
private sphere.183
Nedelsky analyses the policies of liberal states regarding violence
against women (domestic violence as well as other forms of violence), and
shows that liberal legal policies that are based on the concept of borders
and aim to create a separation between victims and their victimizers have
failed to protect women. This failure is attributable, inter alia, to the fact
that in many cases the violence constitutes a part of the relationships within
which women are embedded. Therefore, the attempt to distance the victims
from the source of the violence is mostly inefficient — and sometimes even
impossible. As an alternative, Nedelsky suggests that the relevant legal
rules should be formulated in relational terms, focusing on the
constructiveness of the relationships between men and women and not on
the borders between them. Leaning on the example of revisions made in
the Canadian law dealing with sexual assaults,184 she shows that
formulating rules on the basis of equal and respectful relationships is more
likely to lead to the enhancement of women’s safety and the prevention of
violent relationships than formulating those rules in terms of borders.
Nedelsky’s conclusion is twofold. First, she resolves the alleged
contradiction between the relational approach and feminist intuition with
regard to the concept of borders by showing that borders have failed to
serve as an adequate framework for protecting women from violence.
Second, and more importantly for our discussion, Nedelsky shows that the
relational conception does not inherently lead to the expansion of the
state’s presence in individuals’ lives, but rather merely changes the way the
state acts within the private sphere. Instead of setting borders, the state can
regulate relationships; either way, the state is already present in all
individuals’ lives. Moreover, Nedelsky’s discussion leads to another
conclusion: that the liberal approach as well — and not just the relational
one — in fact formulates the relationships between individuals. In other
words, the difference between the liberal conceptualization of legal rules
and the relational one lies not in the extent of the state’s presence within
the private sphere, but rather in the nature of the relationships each

183. Id. at 200-30.
184. See id. at 218-21.
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promotes. While the liberal approach mostly focuses on the borders
between individuals,185 the relational one focuses on the constructiveness of
the relationships between them.
I would add to Nedelsky’s conclusion another important layer, which is
not discussed in her work: regarding the border between the state and the
individuals. While Nedelsky rejects the concept of borders between
individuals, she does not discuss the borders between individuals and the
state. The liberal approach justifies state interventions within the family,
but only to a certain extent, especially when an individual’s liberty causes
Liberals justify placing
harm to another individual’s liberty.186
responsibility on the state to enforce equality and rights within the family,
intervene in what is conceived as pathological (such as rape and violence in
the family187), implement welfare policies,188 and so on. Therefore, both
liberal and relational approaches acknowledge the legitimacy of state’s
involvement in people’s lives.
However, there is an inherent difference between the liberal and
relational conceptualization of state’s intervention in the private sphere.
Liberals insist on drawing a clear line between individuals and the state,
thus limiting the latter’s intervention in people’s lives. Where the line
between individuals and the state is located, according to John Stuart Mill,
is one of the most fundamental questions in liberal theory,189 and has not
185. But see Dagan and Dorfman’s liberal account of relational justice, supra note
51 and accompanying text.
186. In this respect, liberals differ from libertarians, who advocate minimizing the
state’s intervention in the private sphere as much as possible. See, e.g., ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). For a critique on the libertarian notion
of state nonintervention, see, for example, Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of
Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985) (arguing that it is the state’s regulation that
determines the right to possess, i.e., that even when it seems, from a libertarian point of
view, that the state does not intervene, its power over people’s lives is constant).
Another set of critiques of the notion of state nonintervention is found in feminist
scholarship on the distinction between the private and the public, specifically on the
family. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1984) (arguing that the state’s alleged “nonintervention” in
the family is no less active than its “intervention,” since it constitutes an active decision
to maintain the hierarchal, sometimes destructive, power relations within the family).
187. Note that the definition of “pathological” is constantly changing. Not too many
years ago a wife’s rape by her husband and domestic violence were not considered to
justify state intervention. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
188. The implementation of welfare policies in the family is considered to justify
enhanced state intervention in the family. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization
of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009).
189. MILL, supra note 21, at 3-4.
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been solved to this day. Conversely, the relational approach enables us to
rethink the concept of the border between the state and individuals. Instead
of focusing on the border and trying to determine its appropriate location,
the relational theory turns the spotlight on the relationships between the
state and individuals. The state is not a monolithic entity, whose reach
terminates at a certain spot; rather, relationships between the state and
individuals are complex and dynamic. Therefore, the “border” between the
state and the individuals is in fact a fiction. To be clear: I do not contend
that there is no distinction between the private and public sphere; I merely
suggest that the terminology of borders is inadequate for describing and
prescribing the relations between both spheres.190 The state is an inherent
part of the network of relationships that persons are embedded in, and at
the same time, it is responsible for the relationships that constitute this
network. Moreover, the relationships between the state and individuals
enhance people’s personal autonomy in some respects, but infringe it in
other respects. The complexity of the relationships between individuals
and the state, which is revealed through the relational theory, leads to the
conclusion that the fundamental question with regard to the state’s power
within the private sphere should not be where do we draw the line between
the state and individuals, but rather how constructive are the relationships
between the state and individuals.
Consequently, it does not suffice to examine the ways that legal rules
formulate the relationships among individuals; the relationships between
the state and individuals should be scrutinized as well. It is extremely
crucial, for instance, to identify the cases in which the state enhances
coercive socialization and reformulate the relationships between the state
and individuals in such cases, so they enhance people’s personal autonomy
instead of infringing it. The solution to possible coercion and paternalism
by the state is not found in the retreat of the state from individuals’ lives.
This solution is infeasible, since the state is inherently present in them. It
might also be harmful, since, as we have seen in the previous sections, the
state has a major and active role in promoting people’s personal autonomy.
Rather, the solution is to identify the cases in which the relationships
between the state and individuals are not constructive enough (or even
destructive), and enhance their constructiveness.
To sum, the discussion in this short Section provides two preliminary
replies to the concern that the relational conceptualization of the right to
personal autonomy would enhance the state’s involvement in individuals’
190. For other, contemporary discussions on the fluidity and complexity of the
public-private distinction, see, for example, Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 51, at 142430; and Hila Shamir, The Public/Private Distinction Now: The Challenges of
Privatization and of the Regulatory State, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2014).
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lives. First, as Nedelsky shows, what matters is not the extent that the state
is involved, but rather the way it formulates the relationships among
individuals. Second, as I argue, it is no less important to address the
constructiveness of the relationships between individuals and the state.
Both replies not only diminish the fear of the state’s involvement in the
promotion of people’s autonomy, but also provide a new framework for
thinking about the distinction between the private and the public. A
relational discussion in the context of states duties should be further
developed in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article lays preliminary foundations for a relational
conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy. It leans in part on the
liberal attempt to articulate such a right, unveils the substantial limitations
of the liberal conception of autonomy for this task, and turns to the
relational conception of personal autonomy as a more adequate ground for
the articulation of the right to personal autonomy. The aim of this Article
thus was to explore the potential of the relational conception to serve as a
basis for the legal right to personal autonomy, and begin conceptualizing
the right itself. It did so by introducing three aspects of state responsibility
— namely, providing constructive relationships, ensuring the
constructiveness of existing relationships, and preventing destructive
relationships. Each aspect is relevant to relationships that are provided by
the state, as well as relationships between individuals and institutions and
among individuals. The state has a duty to ensure the existence of
constructive relationships in people’s lives, as well as a duty to initiate and
encourage deliberative autonomy-enhancing processes of decision-making.
It should be emphasized that these duties of the state do not replace the
duty to expand the citizens’ variety of options in various contexts — a duty
that is based on the liberal conceptualization of the right to personal
autonomy. Rather, both kinds of duties supplement each other. Together,
the duties discussed in this Article begin to provide a clearer definition of
the right to personal autonomy, thus overcoming some of its current
vagueness in legal discourse.
Obviously, it has not been my intention in this Article to provide a full
articulation of the right to personal autonomy, but merely to highlight the
need for its renewed, relational conceptualization, and set its foundations.
The aspects of state responsibility discussed above should be further
developed in future research, inter alia, by delving into specific issues in
various contexts. In another part of my research, for example, I focus on
the articulation of the right to personal autonomy within the family,
specifically with regard to the management of marital property. Another
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relevant context for future advancement of the right to personal autonomy
is the doctrine of informed consent, which was briefly addressed in some
parts of this Article. Many aspects of the debate on the autonomy of
women in the context of abortions should also be discussed in light of the
relational conceptualization of the right to personal autonomy, and can shed
important light on the articulation of such a right. To conclude, much work
has yet to be done in order to thoroughly and adequately articulate the right
to personal autonomy; hopefully, the ideas set forth in this Article can serve
as a starting point for this task.
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